The BIG vote at DISNEY, plus boomerang at Under Armour, “board observer” at LKQ, and Sonos’ vote against CEO

PROXY COUNTDOWN SCRIPT

<THEME MUSIC>


This is Proxy Countdown. Welcome to the big show for the week of March 11, 2024  alongside my tag team partner Matt Moscardi. I'm Damion Rallis. On today’s countdown:


  1. A boomerang CEO at a sportswear company;

  2. A director named Joe who refuses to leave LKQ

  3. Sonos shareholders don’t like their CEO

  4. Qualcomm shareholders asleep at the wheel

  5. And on The Big Vote, the boys are wrestling at Disney




<TRADE WIRE BUMPER>

Trade Wire - BUY/SELL

Top Stories:

  1. A Boomerang CEO alert at Under Armour: founder Kevin Plank is back at the job

    1. Stephanie C. Linnartz, who lasted 13 months, will leave with $2.6M cash; a 2024 bonus; full vesting of her remaining sign-on equity worth $7.3M; continued COBRA benefits for 2 years; and the remaining rent on her apartment lease in Baltimore.

      1. In connection with his appointment as CEO, Kev-Bo will hand Chair duties to Mohamed El-Erian

      2. It’s worth noting that director Carolyn Everson has been a director at two high-profile Boomerang CEO events: Bob Iger at Disney and now Kevin Plank at Under Armour

  2. They can’t quit Joseph Holsten at LKQ Corporation

    1. He’s been a CEO, a director, a Vice Chair, a co-CEO, board chair, Chairman Emeritus, and now… drumroll please… a “Board observer.” He won’t vote, he won’t have fiduciary duties, but he will sit there and stare at the other directors and wink once for “vote no” and wink twice for vote “yes”

  3. Bill Brown is the new CEO at 3M Company. He is replacing Michael F. Roman, who will be transitioning to an Executive Chair role. 

    1. The new CEO’s golden hello package is valued at $17M ($3M cash; $14M equity)

    2. The Board also waived the mandatory retirement age of 65 years for Mr. Roman and Mr. Brown.

  4. Comtech Telecommunications terminated CEO Ken Peterman after less than 2 years on the job for cause due to conduct unrelated to Comtech’s business strategy, financial results or previously filed financial statements.

    1. Chief Corporate Development Officer John Ratigan will serve as interim CEO

    2. Current director Mark Quinlan will become the new board Chair

    3. As usual, despite being a publicly traded company, there is seemingly no obligation to tell shareholders why the hell the CEO was just fired after less than 2 years on the job.


<PROXY CAGE MATCH BUMPER>



PROXY CAGE MATCH

  1. In this space we usually update the 3-way Proxy Cage Match at Disney but seeing as Disney is the subject of The Big Vote this week let’s focus on a different kind of proxy cage match:

    1. Saba Capital Management has nominated seven directors for election to the Boards of 10 BlackRock closed-end funds at their respective 2024 Annual Meetings.

      1. Additionally, Saba filed a lawsuit against the BlackRock ESG Capital Allocation Term Trust for adopting an illegal “Entrenchment Bylaw” that deprives shareholders of their right to elect directors annually. Under the Entrenchment Bylaw, any share not voted in a contested election is counted as a vote for BlackRock. 


 


<VOTE RESULTS BUMPER>


VOTE RESULTS TABLE 


Moving over to our vote results table:

  1. At smallcap companies:

    1. At Natural Grocers by Vitamin Cottage, 73% of shareholders without the last name Isley voted to remove sibling directors Heather and Kemper Isley 

    2. 26% of all votes at Maximus said YES to a labor rights shareholder proposal asking for a third party assessment on the Company’s commitment to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights

      1. The Adjusted non-ESG Skeptic vote shows a majority support: 50.3%

    3. And at Sonos, 19% voted to boot out CEO Patrick Spence

      1. the Adjusted non-ESG Skeptic vote came to 40% AGAINST.

      2. All other directors had high levels of support, as did Say on Pay (96%), so the takeaway is clear: Sonos shareholders don’t like their CEO

  2. And at largecap companies, shareholders are either happy or not paying attention or rubber stamping everything management does (I call this the ‘If Blackrock jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge would you?’ proxy voting standard:

    1. Nothing really to report at Nordson

      1. Christopher Mapes over 10%

    2. Or at Qualcomm

      1. All directors high support; Jeff Henderson lowest (6% against)

      2. Say on Pay 9% against

      3. At Qualcomm, 88% of shareholders even voted to support two anti-shareholder proposals: one on “officer exculpation” and another on essentially muting shareholder lawsuits by allowing them to be tried in federal court and not in the state of Delaware.



<THE BIG VOTE BUMPER>

THE BIG VOTE

-Walt Disney

AGM Date: April 3, 2024


Documents

2024 Proxy

2023 Proxy

2023 Voting results

2022 Voting results

General Observations

  1. Ownership

    1. Institutional voting power

      1. Vanguard 8%

      2. BlackRock 7%

      3. Major retail ownership - 33% retail, 0.07% insider

  2. Performance outliers:

    1. Overall: .396

      1. Calvin McDonald .653

      2. Carolyn Everson .132

    2. EBITDA .501

      1. Calvin McDonald .856

      2. Amy Chang .817

      3. Carolyn Everson .174

      4. Michael Froman .188

    3. TSR .457

      1. none

    4. Carbon .509

      1. Calvin McDonald .885

      2. Carolyn Everson .124

    5. Controversies .159

      1. Calvin McDonald .462


  1. Board stuff

    1. Female Power Gap 45%/42%

      1. Industry average female influence = 14%

    2. Diversity Power Gap 29%

      1. Industry average diversity influence = 17%

    3. Insider influence: 8%

      1. Industry average 75%

        1. Dictatorships (Media Industry Peers)

          1. Comcast Brian Roberts 66%

          2. Meta Platforms Zuck 74%

          3. Netflix Reed Hastings 66%

          4. Paramount Global Shari Redston 59%

          5. Fox Lachlan Murdoch 81%

          6. Amazon Jeff Bezos 67%

          7. Alphabet Brin/Page 75%

        2. Democracies

          1. Apple Tim Cook 25%

            1. Only because Steve Jobs died

          2. Warner Brothers Discovery David Zaslav 14%

            1. formed from WarnerMedia's spin-off by AT&T and merger with Discovery, Inc. in 2022.

            2. WarnerMedia was established as Time Warner in 1990, following a merger between Time Inc. and Warner Communications

            3. AT&T not controlled

        3. This war isn’t about Disney. It’s about billionaires’ fascination with being famous and getting involved with media? In any case, Peltz wouldn’t dare go after Apple, WBD is a forever headache, and the rest are dictatorships. This is all about vanity. And Blackwells is here for some wisely spent marketing budget resulting in an inordinate amount of press

    4. Star CEOs and one super director: this is an “offensive line” board meant to block for its CEO to do what it wants

      1. Mary Barra GM CEO/Chair since 2014

      2. Safra Catz Oracle CEO since 2014

      3. James Gorman Exec Chair/former CEO (2010-2023) Morgan Stanley

      4. Bob Iger

      5. Calvin McDonald CEO lululemon athletica since 2018

      6. Mark Parker Exec Chair/former CEO (2006-2020) Nike

      7. Super Director Derica Rice: CVS, Eli Lilly, Carlyle, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Target

    5. Connections

  2. The day Bob won: a filing with these headlines:

    1. Bob Iger just got the backing of Walt and Roy Disney’s heirs in the proxy fight with Nelson Peltz

    2. Disney Heirs Line Up Against Activist Investors

    3. Disney’s heirs snub activist investors and throw their support behind Bob Iger

    4. Disney Family Rebukes Nelson Peltz, Praises Bob Iger in Shareholder Letter


Matt:

Company stats:

  • Major competitors - Netflix, Fox, etc

    • 36% revenue from parks (70% earnings)

  • Stock (underperform): 

    • YTD: 24% (v 8.5% SP)

    • 1Y: 20.2% (v 34%)

    • 2Y: -14.6% (v 23.1%)

    • 5Y: -2.2% (v 83.4%)

  • Valuation: 

    • Valuation: Undervalued

    • PE: 60s

  • News: 

    • Controversies

      • All labor - underpayment, wage discrimination

        • Explains why Disney is so sensitive to their employees wrath - they have multiple class action lawsuits over labor

      • Wokeness

    • Central to the proxy fight: Disney/Fox acquistion

      • March 2019 close, more than doubles Disney’s reportable assets (37% of asset value is goodwill)

      • ISS/GL approve the deal

      • Horizontal merger while linear TV dies…


Board stats:

  • Aristocracy- majority influence is current or ex CEOs

  • Less than half the board are CEOs, 42% of influence

  • Wonderfully underperforming board - 396 batting overall

  • 92% of the board is connected to one another through other boards, 100% of the board is connected through affiliations and boards (Council of Foreign Relations)

    • This puts Disney in the rarified air of just 4 or 5 US large cap companies - the most handshake bro boards in our database


Board CYA needs:

  • Pretty please, stock price go up

  • Woke needle threading

  • Stop acquiring shit


The proxy war:

  • Disney stock underperforms

    • Both activists targeting DIS thanks to years of TSR underperformance, no dictatorship

    • Reasons include Iger, poor acquisitions, DIS is not NFLX

    • Overall view: the board lacks skills to bring Disney forward

  • The “fixes”

    • Trian: Restore the Magic

      • Leverage the “flywheel” - movies, TV, merchandise, rides, video games in a circular self selling machine

      • Awesome IP, customer loyalty, burdened by poor acquisitions, distractions, and unspoken: wokeness

      • Trian campaign is some variation of MAGA for media

        • Disney brand used to mean “family” in the traditional American sense

        • Disney the company expanded the definition of family to include all flavors of family, expand the customer base

        • Becomes the central cog in the anti-woke movement against them - bring back the traditional family, stop being inclusive

      • Plan:

        • Corporate Governance - add Peltz and Rasulo, fix succession, align pay with performance, add board-level strategy committee

        • Media profitability - “Insist” on a strategy for Netflix-like margins, layoffs (“right size”) and change marketing tactics, org chart

        • Creative engine - add board-led review of studio operations and culture, push for new IP, digital cross promotion

        • Strategic focus - give investors targets, sell non-core, make digital ESPN more profitable, refine parks targets

        • Add Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo

      • Go back to the glory days

    • Blackwells: The Future of Disney

      •  Low R&D in technology, no AR/VR/AI experience

      • The board lacks the skills

      • Blackwells’ campaign is some version of self-marketing and “AI will save you”

      • Plan:

        • Direct to consumer: sports, bundling, churn reduction, 

        • Creative: make more Avengers movies in “asset lite” approach without major acquisitions and reboots

        • Technology: redo the organization chart and add a CTO at c-suite, spend more on tech R&D, add AI/VR/AR to the flywheel, improve algorithms/spacial computing, real time AI crowd management and optimizations for parks - be a tech company and say AI more

        • Add Craig Hatkoff, Leah Solivan, Jennifer Schell

    • Vote Disney: We already do everything you’ve asked better than you’ve asked it

      • We’re already close to winning on streaming/creativity - 6 of top 10 most streamed movies across all platforms

      • Sports betting with PENN (ESPN BET), bundled with Fox and WBD streaming service

      • Stake in Epic Games

      • Flywheel is awesome, and we’re better off than our other legacy competitors

      • Plan:

        • Studio focus

        • Streaming profitability

        • ESPN’s future

        • “Supercharge” experiences

  • Reality Check

    • Arguments revolve around two things: Disney doesn’t make shareholders enough money, and Disney sucks at manipulating humanity in a world that is doing it algorithmically

      • The flywheel might be a hamster wheel - legacy media doesn’t fit algorithmic present and AI future that lives on nudges, addictiveness vs. storytelling and creativity

    • The vast majority of the bitching really should be about succession, not performance

      • Pre-Chapek era Iger was a hero, Chapek succession was a masterclass in terrible (mixed with a pandemic was a cocktail for dismal), post-Chapek era Iger “underperforms”

      • Not one of the decks can agree on how much Disney directors have underperformed despite the activists both agreeing they underperformed

        • TSR numbers totally different between Trian and Blackwells

        • Iger individual returns:

          • Trian: 221% (since 2000)

          • Blackwells: 20.7% (since returning in 2022)

          • Disney:728% (both tenures)

    • Disney just “solve” the creativity problem - and no one can solve the anti-woke pushback and get back to “old Disney”

      • How old are we going?  Like vaguely to openly racist and homophobic 50s-80s Disney?  White family values ABC 90s-00s Disney? 

      • Disney can’t solve the culture wars, and neither can technology

    • The board IS one of the most insular, they DO underperform, and they DO lack skills they need other than being friends 

Proposal 1: Election of 11 Directors

Annual Elections for ALL directors? YES

Director Slate

  1. Mary T. Barra f 62 2017 10% c

    1. Chair and Chief Executive Officer, General Motors Company

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: General Motors Company (2014–Present)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 6%


  1. Safra A. Catz f 62 2018 3% a

    1. CEO, Oracle Corporation

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: Oracle Corporation (2001–Present)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 2%


  1. Amy L. Chang f 47 2021 7% n

    1. Former EVP, Cisco Systems, Inc; former Head of Product, Google

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: Procter & Gamble (2017–Present)

      1. Former Public Company Directorships: Marqeta, Inc. (2021–2022); Cisco Systems, Inc. (2016–2018)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 4%


  1. D. Jeremy Darroch m 61 2024 7% a

    1. Former Executive Chair/CEO, Sky (owned by Comcast)

      1. Defense against Trian

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC (2022–Present)

      1. Former Public Company Directorships: Ahren Acquisition Corp. (2021–2023); Burberry Group plc (2014–2019); Sky PLC (2004–2018)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: n/a


  1. Carolyn N. Everson f 52 2022 8% c

    1. Former President, Instacart; former VP Meta Platforms; former exec at MTV Networks

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: Under Armour, Inc. (2023–Present); The Coca-Cola Company (2022–Present)

      1. Former Public Company Directorships: Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. (2016–2018)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 2%


  1. Michael B.G. Froman m 61 2018 3% n

    1. President, Council on Foreign Relations; former Vice Chair/President, Mastercard

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: n/a

    3. Trian target

    4. Votes Against Last AGM: 5%


  1. James P. Gorman m 65 2024 6%

    1. Executive Chair/former CEO, Morgan Stanley

      1. Defense against Trian

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: Morgan Stanley (2010–Present)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: n/a

  1. Robert A. Iger m 72 2000 19%

    1. CEO

      1. CEO Disney (2005-2020); Chair Disney (2012-2021)

      2. Executive Committee with Mark Parker

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: n/a

      1. Former Public Company Directorships: The Walt Disney Company (2000–2021); Apple Inc. (2011–2019)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 4%


  1. Maria Elena Lagomasino f 74 2015 13% nC

    1. CEO, We Family Offices; former CEO JP Morgan Private Bank; former CEO GenSpring Family Offices, LLC, an affiliate of SunTrust Banks

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: The Coca-Cola Company (2008–Present)

    3. Trian target

    4. Votes Against Last AGM: 9%


  1. Calvin R. McDonald m 52 2021 6% c

    1. CEO, lululemon athletica inc.

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: lululemon athletica inc. (2018–Present)

      1. Former Public Company Directorships: Sephora Americas (2013–2018)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 5%


  1. Mark G. Parker m 68 2016 12% N

    1. Board Chair; Chair of Executive COmmittee

    2. Former CEO/Executive Chair, Nike, Inc.

    3. Other Public Company Directorships: NIKE, Inc. (2006–Present)

    4. Votes Against Last AGM: 9%


  1. Derica W. Rice m 58 2019 5% A

    1. Former EVP, CVS Health; former CFO Eli Lilly

    2. Other Public Company Directorships: The Carlyle Group Inc. (2021–Present); Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (2020–Present); Target Corporation (2007–2018); (2020–Present)

    3. Votes Against Last AGM: 8%


  1. Francis deSouza 8%






Ultimately, both activists blame the board here, and both root the issue in two things:


  1. Board lacks skills

  2. Bob Iger’s power and succession planning


Skills

  • We looked through all of Disney’s self-reported skills matrices - 2021-2024 - for the board

  • Two things are clear:

    • First - Iger and the board have avoided giving anyone with media experience influence, and generally avoids anyone with media experience at all

      • The entire board meets basic criteria according to proxy - finance, leadership, marketing, ops, risk, and “ESG” - but what you really have is a board that is 92% CEOs and ex-CEOs

      • True backgrounds are more varied - Darroch was in media, Everson worked in ad sales at media company, but every other non-Iger has no media background - only 11% of influence is media (ex Iger)

      • Having basically no one with direct media experience means Iger is unchallenged in what is 70% of the company spend and the heart of the “flywheel” - creative

    • Second - ACTUAL finance backgrounds are hard to come by, especially with the board that took out the Fox debt

      • Number of ibankers, bankers, finance people in 2018: Lagomasino (private banking) out of 10 directors

      • There were more people with backgrounds in cosmetic sales than banking when they spend 80bn on 21st Century Fox

      • Instead the focus then and now: sales influence, which has been above 50% for last three years, but in 2018

  • Blackwells is correct - the lack of future tech experience and the mix of mostly sales-related and non-media experience serves to position Iger as the only authority in the room on the vast bulk of Disney’s company revenue

  • But almost none of the activist nominees fix the problem

    • Peltz has zero media experience, just a billionaire with opinions

    • Rasulo was CFO at Disney - can you name a CFO who’s legacy was creative media?

    • Hatkoff says “deep media experience”, but his experience is entirely in real estate and as a board member at iHeartRadio, a radio subsidiary of Clear Channel - can we really call being a board member at a radio subsidiary “deep media experience”?

    • Schell worked at Disney in the late 90s/00s for a few years, has ACTUAL media experience

    • Solivan was in venture backed startups, no media

  • And none of them have actual tech backgrounds that Disney needs

    • Peltz and Rasulo, please

    • Solivan was founder of TaskRabbitt, her LinkedIn claims a computer science degree - but she graduated from a college that didn’t offer computer science as a major until after she left

    • No one has AI experience at all, Schell again is closest with production of some media-to-tech failures (anyone remember WarnerBrothers NFTs?)


Power, Performance, and Succession

  • First, let’s settle the performance debate for the directors using three angles:

    • Cap value add - we measure the influence of every director in every year, multiply it by the total change in market cap for the company boards they sit on, and tell you how much total market cap value added has happened for the director across every company

    • COMPANY cap value add - we can show just for the one company how much market capitalization the director is responsible for adding from 2018 on

    • TSR batting average - we compare director TSR every year relative to directors in the same sector and size and build a “win percentage” or “batting average” - basically showing how often a director “wins” against director peers on TSR, where a .500 director is exactly sector average

    • Cap value add:

      • As a group, Disney’s board added $13bn to Disney’s market cap at Disney… but $91bn everywhere else… meaning this board might actually be good when they have the skills necessary to be useful to the company

        • This compares to $32bn cap value added for boards in Movies & Entertainment industry, and better than the $11bn for all boards globally

      • As individuals, Iger is by far the top performer with $93bn added, and the addition of Gorman is helpful with $12bn added

      • As individuals on Disney? No one hold a candle to Bob Chapek, who shed $28bn in cap value, and Amy Chang and Calvin McDonald are victims of timing, but Susan Arnold oversaw $4bn in lost cap value and Maria Lagomasino lost $2.6bn herself

      • Worse, having Derica Rice on your board basically guarantees you shrink in size - since 2018,  he’s been on four separate boards, three of which lost cap during his tenure (Target being the only exception)

      • 40% of the board members since 2018 have had losing cap value numbers, half of which are attributable entirely to Disney - the boards have sucked at helping Disney

      • MEANWHILE… 

        • Peltz has $6.3bn in cap value added, and it’s almost ENTIRELY from Procter & Gamble despite being on seven boards since 2018

        • Peltz would rank 6th on the Disney boards since 2018, Rasulo has -$177m to his name ranking 16th, and Hatkoff has $19m added ranking 14th - it’s not exactly replacing performance with performance?

    • TSR

      • Only 3 of the 13 directors (one of whom is DeSouza) actually rank below 400 batting average on TSR since 2018 - meaning the majority of the board is actually average

      • Top performer on the board now is Calvin McDonald at 633, the only above average director

      • Peltz is average at 494, Hatkoff is an average at 430, but Rasulo is below average at 327 and would come in AS THE WORST TSR performer on the Disney board

    • Overall… DISNEY is right, they are basically average, not horrible

      • BUT… they are the wrong board for the company


Recommendations

  • Vote FOR Schell

    • She’s the closest thing you’ll get to tech + media, it will add some activist-backed media experience Iger can’t totally ignore, and break up some of what is a 100% connected board

  • Vote AGAINST Peltz, Rasulo, Hatkoff, Solivan… and Mel Lagomasino

    • The board expansion to 12 was meant in part to dilute any potential winners here - reduce it back to 11 and get rid of what is your weakest performer on the existing team Lagomasino is highly connected, 8 years of tenure, and not value additive - and it’s a bone to the activists

  • Downside here - you lose most of your person diversity, but next year you absolutely have to find some non-white humans not connected to this board with finance and tech experience to put on this board

  • It’s shocking the the “answer” for both activists is so myopic and lame


Proposal 2: Auditor

  1. Ernst & Young 6% NO 2023

Proposal 3: Say on Pay

  1. 14% NO in 2023

    1. 15% NO in 2022

  2. CEO Bob Iger

    1. 2024 proxy achievements:

      1. In fiscal 2023, we restructured the Company to restore creativity to the heart of the business. We implemented financial discipline across all of our operations, including over-achieving our target of identifying cost savings of $5.5 billion.

      2. Mr. Iger assisted the Succession Planning Committee in ongoing leadership succession planning.

      3. Disney was named one of “America’s Most Trustworthy Public Companies” by Newsweek and was #1 in a “Brand Intimacy Study” recognizing our power in building bonds with consumers. The Company was also named one of the “World’s Most Admired Companies” by Fortune, and Fast Company ranked Disney as one of the “Most Innovative Companies."

      4. Media industry peers include Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta Platforms

    2. $32M

      1. $26M equity

        1. $10M options

      2. $2.5M perks (security/jet)

Proposal 4: Say on Pay, part 2

  1. Stock Incentive Plan

Proposal 5: SHP 1

  1. Golden parachutes

  2. Kenneth Steiner/John Chevedden

Proposal 6: SHP 2

  1. Report on Political Expenditures

  2. The Educational Foundation of America

Proposal 7: SHP 3

  1. Report on Gender Transitioning Compensation and Benefits

  2. National Legal and Policy Center

Proposal 8: SHP 4

  1. Publication of Charitable Contributions

  2. National Center for Public Policy Research

Proposal 9: Trian

  1. Nelson Peltz

    1. Current

      1. Unilever (2022-)

      2. Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. (2015-)

      3. The Wendy’s Company, Chair (2007-)

    2. Past

      1. Janus Henderson Group  (2022)

      2. Invesco (2020-2022)

      3. Legg Mason (2020-2022)

      4. The Procter & Gamble Company (2020-2022)

      5. Sysco Corporation (2020-2022)

      6. Mondelez International (2020-2022)

      7. Ingersoll-Rand plc (2020-2022)

      8. Legg Mason, Inc (2020-2022)

      9. H.J. Heinz Company (2020-2022)

      10. Triarc Companies, CEO/Chair (1993-2007)

      11. Triangle Industries, CEO/Chair (1983-1998)

  2. Jay Rasulo

    1. Disney CFO (2010-2015)

    2. Chairman of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts Worldwide (2005-2009)

    3. President of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts (2002-2005)

    4. iHeartMedia (2019-)

      1. RADIO?!

  3. Ike Perlmutter

    1. Not a nominee

    2. From Disney filing:

      1. Former Marvel exec Ike Perlmutter — whose fraught history with Bob Iger is publicly documented —owns ~79% of the shares Trian claims to represent and has collaborated with Peltz to run two consecutive proxy contests”

      2. Perlmutter’s oversight of Marvel’s studio was severed in 2015 due to his ongoing antagonization of the creative team and vehement opposition to expanding the group’s output to films like Black Panther and Captain Marvel, which ultimately made >$1.3bn and >$1.1bn, respectively, in global box office

      3. Perlmutter left Disney in March 2023 as part of the company’s cost reduction program

      4. Rasulo “is also Perlmutter’s guy. He was the guy that Perlmutter wanted to take over [Disney] and Perlmutter and Bob Iger have been on the outs ever since”

      5. When Iger told Perlmutter that Rasulo wouldn’t be COO in 2015, Perlmutter responded: “You broke my heart”

Proposal 10: Blackwells

  1. Jessica Schell

    1. EVP and General Manager Warner Bros. Home Entertainment (2014-2023)

      1. Operating and strategic responsibility for digital and physical sales, marketing, creative, distribution, finance and administrative functions of the studio’s home entertainment releases.

      2. Planning and development of Virtual Reality and IOT device businesses

    2. Strategic PlanningStrategic Planning, The Walt Disney Company (1996-1999)

    3. From Disney filing:

      1. Would not be considered independent (her brother and/or entities with which he is affiliated have ongoing contractual business relationships with Disney)

  2. Craig Hatkoff

    1. Real Estate

    2. SL Green director (2011-)

      1. 5% influence

    3. Co-founded Tribeca FIlm festival with former wife Jane Rosenthal and Robert DeNiro

  3. Leah Solivan

    1. TaskRabbit founder

    2. B.S., Mathematics and Computer Science, Sweet Briar College, 2001

      1. Did not have Computer Science major until 2017


2023 SHPs

  1. Shareholder proposal requesting a report on operations related to China: 7% FOR

  2. Shareholder proposal requesting charitable contributions disclosure: 7% FOR

    1. Thomas Strobhar

  3. Shareholder proposal requesting a political expenditures report: 36% FOR

    1. The Educational Foundation of America, represented by Rhia Ventures

2022 SHPs

  1. Shareholder proposal requesting a report on both median and adjusted pay gaps across race and gender: 59% FOR

    1. Anne Butterfield




DAMION:

That’s the Proxy Countdown for the week of March 11, 2024. Join us next week when we jump back into the Alternative Democracy pool... forever on the lookout for shareholder sharks, floating bandaids, and wayward directors.






<OUTRO THEME>


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The Big Vote at McCormick, plus Disney vs. ISS and Glass Lewis, and say goodbye to a longtime underperforming director

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The Big Vote at Analog Devices, plus Trian’s Disney white paper and JB Hunt’s unorthodox new board roles